Will strategic autonomy of the emerging middle powers succeed?

While emerging middle powers also represent a heterogeneous group in terms of their historic development, economic weight, and national interests, at present moment all of them are united by the desire to reform the existing framework of the global world order. Currently, there are several indications that they may succeed in this challenging endeavor. This text is featured in the second issue (November 2023) of the "State of the World" periodical published by InterRegional for Strategic Analysis (Abu Dhabi).

Overlooking the political discourse of the last three-four years, one is confronted with the perspective of an inevitablenew cold war between the U.S. and China and a profound concern about such a development. In a statement made in 2019, U.N. Secretary-General Guterrés warned of a world split between the two largest economies creating two separate and competing worlds, each with its own currency, trade and financial rules, and its own zero-sum geopolitical and military strategies. Two years later, Orville Schell, director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations called it a "dangerous and rapid downward spiral." While the theory of a world order based on bipolarity with two superpowers, the U.S. and China, and all other states in between, is still one of the prevailing narratives, the Russian attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, that quickly mutated into a transatlantic-eurasian conflict with an extremely negative impact on global food and energy security among others, makes the U.S.-China confrontation appear less acute. The war in Ukraine has reshuffled the strategic cards and produced at least three fundamental security and geopolitical upheavals:

  1. Strengthening the US-EU transatlantic alliance, resurgence of NATO as a collective defense alliance with formally neutral Sweden and Finland starting NATO accession process (Finland joined NATO on April 4, 2023).
  2. China and Russia moving closer together with their military-political alliance surpassing the level of the cold war era. China did not condemn Russia as an aggressor and, at the same time, called for peace negotiations and presented a proposal for a political settlement in February 2023.
  3. Emergence of a group of states of the so-called Global South that strive to preserve their autonomy amidst European military confrontation and position themselves as mediators between the warring parties.

Another narrative is that Russia’s invasion is an element of the post-Cold War great power competition, and the ongoing war in Ukraine is a harbinger of a global shift from a Western-dominated to a multipolar international system. Indeed, the participation of Brazil, South Africa or Saudi Arabia in the search for a solution to the military conflict in Europe indicate a turnaround: for the moment, the transatlantic allies seem to be unable to find a suitable way out of the hot conflict, while middle powers in Africa, Middle East, and Latin America offer their contribution as stakeholders.

The term 'middle powers' is an analytical category that is applied to states not as influential as superpowers, but still with considerable impact on the international scene. Just as the term ‘Global South’, it describes a very heterogeneous group of states. Basically, we have to distinguish between traditional middle powers, such as Canada, Australia or Japan, which are politically and militarily strongly integrated into the transatlantic bloc, and emerging middle powers, such as India, Brazil, South Africa or Saudi Arabia, which are the subject of this article. By currently trying to act as mediators in the Ukraine crisis they are positioning themselves as important actors in the global peace and security policy. Yet in the long run, they are concerned with restructuring the global world order in a way that allows them to expand and strengthen their strategic autonomy, which means to take own decisions on when, in what area, how, and with whom to cooperate based on national interests and foreign policy preferences, without being constrained by other countries. While emerging middle powers also represent a heterogeneous group in terms oftheir historic development, economic weight, and national interests, at present moment all of them are united by the desire to reform the existing framework of the global world order.  Currently, there are several indications that they may succeed in this challenging endeavor.


When talking about the successfully held G20 summit in New Delhi, India's G20 Sherpa Amitabh Kant revealed the extensive efforts to formulate paras on Ukraine in the summit’s Joint statement. He emphasized the crucial collaboration among India, Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia, with strong support from other middle powers Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Argentina, and Turkey, that helped to get China's, Russia’s and G7 endorsement. While for Kant the achieved outcome symbolized a “victory for multilateralism”, it also clearly reflects the ability of the emerging middle powers to maneuver between the different blocs without adopting their position in conflicting issues or abandoning their own foreign policy principles and interests. The officially announced accession of the African Union will give emerging powers more weight within the G20, in which the G7 countries have so far played a dominant role.

Another indicator that the bold voice of the middle powers is carrying more weight is the recognition by the G7 members of the demand to push for reform of multilateral political and financial institutions. US President Joe Biden promised to urge the process of fundamentally reshaping and scaling up the multilateral development banks, especially the World Bank and the IMF. In the run-up to the UN General Debate 2023, the German foreign Annalena Baerbock called for essential reforms of the UN system, stating the urgency of making it fairer, more inclusive and capable of taking action. In the New Delhi Declaration the G20 members reaffirm the need to pursue WTO reform and commit to the goal of “having a complete and well-functioning dispute settlement system accessible to all members by 2024.”The reform debates are anything but new and have been going on for decades, with developing countries demanding fair, equitable and rules-based cooperation. Brazil, for instance, declared in 1993 the reform of the global financial institutions to be a priority of its foreign policy by expanding ties with China, Russia and India. The pursuit of a solution to above mentioned concerns seems to be gaining momentum as big power competition over economic influence and for the favor of countries in the Global South is picking up steam.

The likelihood that the issue of reforming the multilateral system in favor of the emerging powers continues to gain traction in the coming years is high, given that Brazil and South Africa will hold the G20 presidencies in 2024 and 2025, respectively. Brazil has already indicated that reform of multilateral institutions (World Bank, IMF, UN Security Council) will be a key topic of its presidency. If G20 countries manage to bring about noticeable motion to the reform agenda, which has been emphasized for years but has not progressed, that will foster the autonomy of the middle powers on the global stage.

The third indicator of growing influence of the middle powers is the changing nature of international alliances. Theclassic alliance theory distinguishes between two forms of alliance building: balancing of weaker states against a hegemonic one and bandwagoning - an alliance of weaker states with the hegemonic one. What we are currently observing is that the new alliances are no longer being formed exclusively around hegemons or superpowers (as was the case in the 19th and 20th centuries), but among middle powers with participation of a superpower on equal terms. For example: 1) The Global Biofuel Alliance launched on September 9, 2023 on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in New Delhi between India, Singapore, Bangladesh, Italy, USA, Brazil, Argentina, Mauritius and UAE; 2) The announced the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) as new infrastructure alliance involving India, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, EU and US that is expected to create a network of sea and rail routes linking the Indian subcontinent to Europe via the Middle East; 3) Expanding thematic and regional reach of the BRICS alliance by accepting middle powers Iran, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Egypt as well as Ethiopia as new members, that represent a powerful force in terms of population, resources and geography.

An important process to be observed in the coming years will be power dynamic among emerging middle powers themselves. It is crucial that possibly existing differences are solved solely by peaceful means and dialogue, since entering into competition or even confrontation with one another would call into question both their alliances as well as their autonomy. It is to assume that in order to be able to further expand their autonomy and put forward their interests, it will be of great importance for the emerging middle powers to actively engage in existing international formats, such as UN and its organizations, but also strive for alliance formations among their equals to speak up with one strong voice.

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